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Foreword to Revisiting the Public Utility
Jim Rossit & Morgan Rickst
In Munn v. Illinois the U.S. Supreme Court upheld state price regulation of
grain elevators.' The Court took some inspiration from Lord Mathew Hale's
notion that a business "affected with a public interest" requires special regulatory
attention.2 "Every ferry," Lord Hale wrote in the Seventeenth Century, "ought to
be under public regulation, to wit: that it give attendance at due time, keep a boat
in due order, and take a reasonable toll."3
As it spread throughout the United States, the idea of the public utility was
undeniably aligned with progressive political reform. At the height of the Gilded
Age in 1887, Congress drew on it to give the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) authority to regulate railroads and their rates as common carriers.' Early
in the twentieth century, American reformers such as John Commons drafted
state laws granting monopoly franchises to electric and natural gas utilities,
subjecting them to customer service obligations (a precursor to the modem
notion of "universal service") and price regulation.6 While he was running for
President, New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt celebrated the benefits of
a privately-owned, regulated public utility for the development of hydroelectric

t

Judge D.L. Lansden Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research, Vanderbilt

University.
I
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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power as a way to structure an industry to benefit the many, rather than the few.'
And during the New Deal, Congress drew on public utility ideas to attack
economic concentration when it broke up utility holding companies and gave
federal regulators authority over interstate gas and electric power rates.8
Public utility regulation also has deep grounding in neoclassical economic
theory. The economic argument that natural monopoly regulation is necessary to
promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare served as an intellectual
anchor for economic regulation of water and sewage services, railroads, airlines,
trucking, natural gas, electric power, and telecommunications.9 All of these
industries experimented with various forms of franchise regulation, service
obligations, and price regulation-establishing a fairly consistent set of tasks for
regulators across various public utility industries. Public utility was theorized as
a form of incomplete contract, which offered financial stability to the regulated
firm (helping to lower its costs of capital) while also protecting consumers from
the abuses associated with monopoly.' 0
In the 1970s, however, the pressures of inflation led many firms subject to
public utility regulation to seek relief from it." Excess capacity and high prices
led many consumers to question its success too. Alfred Kahn, Chair of the
Citizens Airline Board (CAB) under President Carter, sought to dismantle airline
price regulation. This began a national movement to restructure industries
ranging from airlines, trucking, railroads, telephony, natural gas, and electric
power.' 2 Centralized government regulation geared towards consumer protection
was replaced (to one degree of another) with competitive (or at least
"contestable") markets, and some features of traditional public utility industries
were even "deregulated."1 3 A few of public utility regulation's iconic
institutions, such as the ICC and CAB, were eliminated entirely 4 -though it also

7.
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For a critical examination, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Public Utility Pyramids, 41 J.
LEGAL STUD. 37, 38 (2012) (suggesting that economic concentration in the energy sector in the 1920s
was largely aimed at reducing capital costs).
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics and Regulated Monopoly: An
9.
American HistoricalPerspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263 (1984).

10.
George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993).
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See

Stefan H. Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepayers in Nonunanimous

Settlements ofPublic Utility Rate Cases, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 279-82 (1995).
12.
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); Alfred E. Kahn,
Deregulation:Looking Backward andLooking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 725 (1990).
13.
See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation the Theory of
Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984).
14.
While the ICC was eliminated in 1995, some of its remaining regulatory
responsibilities were assigned to a new agency, the Surface Transportation Board. See ICC Termination
Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of49 U.S.C. (2012)).
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Foreword
was said that one of the greatest surprises about deregulation was how little really
occurred."
Economic criticisms of public utility regulation provided intellectual
momentum for this reform initiative. Harold Demsetz began to question the logic
of traditional economic regulation in the 1960s,1 6 and public choice theory and
the Chicago School rose to prominence in its critique of industry regulation
during the 1970s.' 7 Many economists celebrated the allocative efficiency of
competitive markets, calling into question the core features of public utility
regulation: Franchise regulation was criticized for favoring a few at the costs of
the many, inhibiting competition and innovation. Customer service obligations
facilitated cross-subsidies in service costs and, at the extreme, served to limit
customer choices. And price regulation was criticized for encouraging rent
seeking and creating allocative inefficiencies. Some even declared the "end" of
natural monopoly regulation for industries such as electric power.'
But for the most part, the idea of the public utility and the legal institutions
it supported have proved to be durable. Public utility regulation may even be
experiencing a new renaissance. Even with competition in formerly regulated
industries, such as telecommunications and energy, it is recognized that public
utility regulation remains relevant.1 9 With the proliferation of modem "network"
industries, such as telecommunications, the idea of the public utility is being
invoked as a way of addressing new problems associated with private control of
infrastructure. Concerns about network efficiency and the ownership and control
of important information are giving rise to new calls for the extension of
regulation, especially in confronting economic concerns with the modem
information economy.20 Regulators are being called on to extend features of
public utility regulation into new frontiers, including net neutrality, 2 ' certain
aspects of environmental regulation,22 and health care.23
The essays in this special issue of Yale Journalon Regulation challenge the
notion that public utility ideas are obsolete or irrelevant to modem issues in
Robert W. Crandall, Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the AT&T
15.
Divestiture, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1988).
16.
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 IJ.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
17.
See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SC. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More GeneralTheory ofRegulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211 (1976).
18.
Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Coles, Introduction, in THE END OF A NATURAL
MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Peter Z. Grossman

& Daniel H. Coles eds., 2003).
19.
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation ofRegulated
IndustriesLaw, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
20.

BRETT M. FRISCHMANN,

INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED

RESOURCES (2012).
21.

TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES

22.

See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV.

23.

See Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2015).

(2011).
1614 (2014).
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economic regulation.24 They give reasons to question whether public utility
regulation has fallen short of its aspirations and goals, and show that there are
some good reasons to question many embedded regulatory practices. At the same
time, they demonstrate how public utility ideas are foundational to many of
modem regulatory law's tasks. They show how the future of the public utility
remains a vibrant, evolving area of inquiry for law and economic regulation.
We cluster the essays in this issue around public utility regulation's core
rationales and its scope, its implications for innovation and industry stability, and
its evolving approach to price regulation. The endeavor of revisiting the public
utility helps to better understand how it will continue to evolve and play an
important role as we address new economic problems in the twenty-first century.
I. The Scope of Public Utility Regulation
Textbook economic considerations, such as preventing welfare losses
associated with natural monopoly, continue to sit at the center of most academic
and policy debates surrounding public utility regulation. However, public utility
regulation's rationales have never been limited to the neoclassical economics
framework's blinkered notion of economic efficiency. The essays demonstrate
how, in addition to promoting efficiency, modem debates surrounding public
utility regulation continue to reflect a rich array of societal concerns, including
providing for public goods, advancing social welfare, and addressing the
morality of business operations.
Drawing on Progressive-era conceptions of the public utility, Sabeel
Rahman offers an expansive view of how public utility regulation might be
adapted to the modem world.25 He finds deep moral content within the public
utility model of regulation. He thus eschews a narrowly economistic perspective.
Rahman delineates a category of resources that he terms "social infrastructure"
that are practical necessities for participating in social and economic life. These
resources (1) exhibit scale economies, (2) are inputs into a wide range of
downstream uses, and (3) are vulnerable to exploitative private power or
domination. When it comes to social infrastructure, Rahman submits, regulation
should seek to assure affirmative provision to the populace while also
proscribing exploitative or discriminatory management.
Rahman's capacious definition of social infrastructure lends itself to a
correspondingly broad suite of legal and regulatory techniques, ranging from
regulatory supervision, to the employment of"firewalls" between business lines,
to public options, to outright public provisioning. He illustrates the range of
options available by examining two examples: the Flint, Michigan water crisis

24.
These essays were originally presented along with other papers at a Spring 2017
roundtable at Vanderbilt Law School. This conference was sponsored by the Vanderbilt Law School
Programs in Law & Business and Law & Government.
25.
K. Sabeel Rahman, InfrastructuralRegulation and the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. ON
REG. 911 (2018).
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and the (now perennial) net neutrality debate. Like the Progressive-era reformers
before him, Rahman envisions the public utility model as an important tool for
combating concentrations of private power and realizing democratic governance.
Richard Markovits's contribution views broad extension of public utility
regulation of private firms with much greater skepticism.26 He develops a precise
and sophisticated understanding of when economic theory would support
regulating a "business affected with the public interest." For him, however,
extending public utility regulation to any industry based on public interest
concerns without an effort to precisely identify a market imperfection can
produce inefficiency in the allocation of resources, harming investors,
consumers, and workers.
Markovits explains how traditional price regulation produced one such
inefficiency by encouraging some regulated firms to make great investments in
durable assets rather than labor, a problem known to economists as the "AverchJohnson-Wellisz" effect. As Markovits suggests, the failure of price regulation
to produce efficient results does not mean that government lacks any role in
regulating industry, as some have argued. Rather, the allocative inefficiencies
sometimes produced by price regulation invites other institutional solutions to
market failures. He maintains, for instance, that public ownership and production
is sometimes more desirable as an economic matter than applying public utility
price regulation principles to private firms. He also expresses caution about the
use of morality as a justification for price regulation, and warns that price
discrimination that is based on a customer's willingness to pay is only
problematic where it is motivated by a morally opprobrious reason. Markovits
concludes by recommending some reforms to improve the institutional operation
of existing public utility regulation.
II. Innovation and Stability
In many industries-including, but not limited to, telecommunications and
financial services-public utility regulation has long served to anchor debates
surrounding consumer protection. This has implications for competition and
innovation an important set of concerns at the center of modem applications of
public utility regulation.
Christopher Yoo's critique of extending common carriage regulation as a
legal basis for network neutrality illustrates some potential problems with
applying public utility-type regulation to a dynamically changing industry.27
Common carriage rationales for regulation not only involve nondiscriminationwhich prevents charging different prices to similarly situated customers. Yoo
highlights that where a company is vertically integrated it also require some form

26.
Richard Markovits,"Public Utility" Regulation: Some Economic and Moral
Analyses, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 875 (2018).
27.
Christopher S. Yoo, Common Carriage'sDomain, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 991 (2018).
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of rate regulation, since a nondiscriminatory high price can have the same
adverse effect as would discriminatory prices. He suggests that this is why the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)'s emphasis on nondiscrimination
also requires some form of ex ante or ex post rate regulation.
In the context of water, natural gas, and electric power, Yoo maintains,
common carriage regulation's success has depended on five basic factors: (1)
commodity products, (2) simple interfaces, (3) stability and uniformity in the
transmission technology, (4) deployment of the transmission network, and (5)
stable demand and market shares. He argues, however, that none of these five
factors points strongly in the direction of common carriage treatment for
broadband Internet access. Broadband internet services, for example, are not a
single commodity but are diverse, and regulating them as a single commodity
can impair network providers from offering different forms of prioritized
services. Establishing rates could facilitate collusion in the standardization of
services. Rapid, dynamic changes in technology make common carriage
regulation even more challenging in this context, to the extent that new
technologies would create a wedge between replacement cost and historical
costs. Yoo also highlights how common carriage does a poor job of addressing
congestion costs, especially when there is a significant need to expand
infrastructure. While he does not assign a particular weight to each of the five
factors that have led to successful common carriage regulation elsewhere, his
analysis concludes that the overall weight of these factors advises against the
FCC regulating net neutrality on this basis.
Prasad Krishnamurthy's contribution speaks to the systemic effects of
competition in banking.28 New Deal bank regulation employed rate regulation,
geographic segmentation, activity constraints, and entry restriction to limit
competition in the banking sector. Over time these regulatory constraints eroded,
a consequence of market and technological developments as well as shifting
intellectual currents, not to mention regulatory acquiescence. Both the structure
of these regulatory constraints and the timing of their creation and unwinding
mirrored similar U.S. federal regulatory programs in the telecommunications and
transportation industries.
Most analysts have cheered the phase-out of constraints on bank
competition. Krishnamurthy, though, sounds a note of caution. Whatever its
faults, the heyday of New Deal bank regulation coincided with a period of
remarkable stability in U.S. banking. By contrast, the demise of these constraints
coincided with and perhaps occasioned a period of greater instability.
Krishnamurthy acknowledges that the New Deal system produced socially costly
rents for banks. But these rents may have had an underappreciated upside by
encouraging banks to play it relatively safe while also enlisting them to monitor
the migration of banking activity outside the regulatory perimeter. It is at least

28.
Prasad Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences of
Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 823 (2018).
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plausible, Krishnamurthy submits, that the stability benefits of limiting bank
competition outweigh the costs. Economic rents, in other words, can be a
stabilizing force. For better or worse, this regulatory path has not been pursued
in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.
III. Revisting Price Regulation
The essays in this issue also show how modem economic problems
challenge the traditional tools of public utility regulation to evolve in some new
(or at least unconventional) ways. In many industries, such as energy, public
utility regulation's most visible-and most controversial-tool is price
regulation. Traditional forms of price regulation, such as setting rates based on
cost of service, have met with mixed success. In some contexts it has inhibited
efficiency and competitive markets, harming the very consumers that the
regulation was designed to protect in the first place. Still, price regulation
remains an essential feature of public utility regulation. Regulators need not
reject it entirely as there are considerable opportunities to improve upon it.
Determining whether and how price regulation should apply depends crucially
on structural features of the relevant industry.
Daniel Schwarcz questions the rationale for rate regulation in modem
property and casualty insurance markets. The insurance business in the United
States is regulated primarily at the state level.29 In the early twentieth century
coincident with the emergence of public utility regulation many states began
regulating insurance rates. Insurance rate regulation persists in about half of
states today. Schwarcz shows that, as a historical matter, insurance rate
regulation emerged from the view that insurance markets have natural monopoly
characteristics. Actuarial analysis required access to loss data; sharing of loss
data across firms was desirable, even necessary, but it also involved
anticompetitive coordination with respect to insurance premiums and policy
forms. Rate regulation emerged as the standard policy response.
Schwarcz contends that modem conditions have made such rate regulation
unnecessary and, indeed, counterproductive. Loss data is now shared via
intermediaries that are themselves extensively regulated and that produce only
specifically authorized types of data. There is very little risk, Schwarcz argues,
that modem data-sharing practices could give rise to either explicit or tacit
collusion with respect to prices or product design. In fact, modem data sharing
is procompetitive rather than anticompetitive: it lowers barriers to entry and
allows smaller insurance firms to stay in business. On top of that, the largest
insurers no longer need aggregate industry loss data; they can rely on their own
intemal data for underwriting. Schwarcz presents evidence that consumers in

29.
Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35
YALE J. ON REG. 941 (2018).
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states that have opted to deregulate insurance rates have generally benefited, or
at least have not suffered significant adverse consequences. While insurance
markets are afflicted with various market failures that justify regulationincluding information asymmetries and behavioral biases rate regulation is not
responsive to these problems.
William Boyd's contribution probes the historical and intellectual origins
of utility price regulation to draw important lessons for its modem application.30
He begins with an assessment of the medieval idea of the "just price," which
aimed to address the interpersonal market exchange, or what Aristotle identified
as an issue of commutative rather than distributive justice. Boyd shows how
scholastic and economic historians have presented two primary (and at times
contrasting) accounts of the just price in market exchange-one based on the
cost of service, and another (perhaps more revisionist) account based on
voluntary exchange in a competitive market. He also presents a more normative
interpretation of the just price, as grounded in the notion of a moral economy
that requires fairness in exchange between buyers and sellers.
Boyd presents twentieth-century utility price regulation as reflecting a
"blending of the older ideas ofjust price with more modem concerns with natural
monopoly and the regulatory challenges posed by large, capital-intensive
network industries." 31 In other words, the just price provides an intellectual
underpinning for the "just and reasonable" price mandate that Congress and state
legislatures have charged utility regulators to implement in many industries,
including electric power, natural gas, and telecommunications. This insight
allows Boyd to make sense of how agencies like the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) have moved away from the traditional evaluation of costof-service utility rates and instead adopted market-based rates. At the same time,
Boyd cautions, FERC's market-based rates cannot be understood as simple
ratification of any non-coercive market transaction. Rather, in framing the role
of a utility price regulator in a competitive market, the just price origins of rate
regulation stress the significance of regulators paying attention to fairness behind
various transactions. Understood as such, regulators today implementing
competitive markets in formerly-regulated contexts still have some obligation to
be attentive the normative dimension of market exchange, not to merely set a
price based on cost or on whether a market transaction was voluntary.
James Ming Chen argues modem public utility rate regulation could benefit
from paying greater attention to the lessons of modem corporate finance. 32 He
views the legislative command that the government ensure "just and reasonable
rates" for regulated services as a highly specialized application of financial

30.
William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721 (2018).
31.
Id.
32.
James Ming Chen, Speculative Undertakings: Rate Regulation as a Branch of
CorporateFinance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 779 (2018).
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economics-a regulatory exercise in capital asset pricing. Chen argues that insights
from corporate finance would predict a relatively high cost of capital for industries
facing large, capital-intensive assets investments over long time horizons, along
with uncertainty about future prices and regulation. He surveys how various
approaches to rate regulation today rely heavily upon index-based and algorithmic
alternatives to conventional cost-of-service ratemaking. He also illustrates how
incentive-based regulation, or price-level regulation, serves as a popular alternative
to cost-of-service ratemaking, and through its use of broadly gauged price indexes
such as the CPI and industry-specific x-factors, it too is conceptually
indistinguishable from an index-based system of rate regulation.
Chen cautions, however, about potential antitrust concerns with relying too
heavily on market index approaches, to the extent that they facilitate pricegathering and information-sharing among rivals as potentially anticompetitive
practices. He also warns about accepting new forms of price regulation that do
nothing but gauge just and reasonable rates without any critical analysis of
structural market conditions. Ultimately price regulation needs to incorporate a
sophisticated understanding of financial risk an endeavor that by necessity will
require regulators to be attentive to corporate finance models. On Chen's view,
referring to market-set rates without careful evaluation of market conditions,
including risk, would be reversible error. Still, judicial deference has a place: He
concludes that courts should be deferential to the extent that these matters are
predictive in nature but that they also should require agencies implementing
price regulation to adopt an appropriate index and to explain the proper
relationship between market data and the zone of reasonableness in rate setting.
Conclusion
The public utility has a rich history but it is hardly moribund. The essays in
this special issue show that it remains central to modem debates surrounding
economic regulation. Without doubt, in contexts where the public utility has long
anchored regulation, it will continue to undergo reform and refinement.
Revisiting the public utility idea gives us important stories of successes and
failures, and helps us to better understand its goals and rationales. Public utility
principles were fundamental to economic regulation in the past, and we think
that the essays in this special issue show that they will continue to prove
important to designing institutions and regulatory tools to address new economic
problems.
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